The Significance of the Bonga Attack In Nigeria  

Jeff Vail has an interesting look at the significance of the newly emerging capability of MEND to hit offshore oil platforms in Nigeria, which they recently demonstrated by attacking Shell's Bonga platform, 120km off the coast (also at The Oil Drum).

Overnight on June 19th, militants from the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) struck Shell’s offshore Bonga facility, resulting in Shell declaring force majeure for deliveries of 225,000 barrels per day in June and July. Bonga, the first and largest Nigerian offshore facility, is 120km offshore. Then, on June 20th, militants destroyed a key Chevron pipeline near Escravos, Nigeria, forcing Chevron to shut-in and declare force majeure on 120,000 barrels per day. This article will analyze the significance of the Bonga attack in light of Nigeria's efforts to grow its offshore oil production.

What is at Stake?

This recent attack is particularly troubling in Nigeria, where a February, 2006 Citigroup report noted that "clearly most of the (oil production) growth near-term looks to be in the Nigerian deepwater and as such should be less subject to current disruptions." While offshore production currently only accounts for 16% of Nigeria’s oil production, it is expected to account for 90% of future growth. MEND has already demonstrated its capability to shut in significant portions of Nigeria’s onshore oil production, and now it is threatening to re-attack offshore facilities, urging expatriate workers to abandon them immediately. Significantly, Nigeria’s onshore production is already mature, and government hopes of raising total production to 4 million barrels per day are entirely dependent on the success of the offshore sector. If MEND can continue to interrupt offshore production, the prospects for any increase in production from Nigeria look dim. The situation in Nigeria is particularly important as Nigeria is one of the few states with the potential to significantly increase both production and exports. The megaproject list on WikiPedia shows 345,000 bpd of offshore production set to come online in 2008 (Agbami field, Oso field); 220,000 bpd of offshore production in 2009 (Akpo field, Oyo field); 220,000 bpd of offshore production in 2010 (Bonga North, Bonga Ullage fields); 285,000 bpd of offshore production in 2011 (Bosi, Ukot, Usan fields); 250,000 pbd of offshore production in 2012 (Bonga SW, Nsiko fields); and 150,000 bpd of offshore production in 2013 (Egina field).

That’s 1.25 million barrels per day of new offshore production planned in the next 6 years. None of it was previously considered vulnerable to attack. Now it all appears to be within the demonstrated reach of MEND.

MEND: Potential for Innovation & Improved Capabilities

This most recent offshore attack also highlights significant development in MEND’s capabilities. Comments as early as 2006 noted that MEND’s offshore capabilities are continuously improving, and that facilities as far as 50-60 km offshore may be at risk. Bonga is twice that far offshore, at 120km.

I predicted a year ago that MEND would increasingly focus on Nigeria’s offshore facilities for two reasons: to differentiate their ideologically-grounded struggle from the privateers and criminal bunkering that is also interrupting Nigerian production; and as a result of the innovation that naturally results from their decentralized structure. While this most recent attack demonstrates MEND’s ability to operate in the deepwater environment, it also shows significant room for improvement. MEND’s press release stated that their goal was to gain access to and destroy the facility's main control room, but that they were unable to do so. Their failure, however, most likely provided MEND with the specifics of what capabilities, training, and equipment they will need to succeed in the future, suggesting that the improvements in capability demonstrated in this attack are part of a larger cycle of capability improvements (an OODA Loop).